Criticism
Volume 28 | Issue 2

1986

Book Reviews
Criticism Editors

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/criticism
Recommended Citation
Editors, Criticism (1986) "Book Reviews," Criticism: Vol. 28: Iss. 2, Article 5.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/criticism/vol28/iss2/5

Article 5

BOOK REVIEWS

Milton, Poet of Duality by R. A. Shoaf. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1985. Pp. 224. $17.00.

Paradise Lost and the Rhetoric of Literary Forms by Barbara Kiefer Lewalski.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. Pp. 370. $32.50.
These two recent books on Milton ought, one feels, to be more different
from one another than they are. Lewalski's professes to be written from a
perspective appreciative of, if not indeed one with, that of Renaissance literary theory. Shoaf's, by contrast, is informed by modern theory, especially
semiotics, and is therefore offering to be something rather new. Yet both proceed by displacing properly formal or stylistic into moral considerations, as if
(abstract, putatively Christian) morality furnished poetry with its obvious
end. Many of the same dull neoChristian prejudices for which William Empson castigated establishment Miltonists twenty-five years ago crop up yet
again, and solemnly subsist if they cannot be said to thrive, in these hooks'
mildly depressing pages.
Yet one must always make distinctions, and Lewalski's book does have
major virtues. Her central proposition is that Milton in Paradise Lost deliberately deploys the whole gamut of forms comprising the loose and fiuid hierarchy that was the Renaissance genre system: "epic, tragedy, sonnet, verse
epistle, funeral elegy, hymn, epigram, and many more." She holds that Milton invokes and practices this mixed and shifting, yet determinate system in
order indirectly to inform and comment upon his Biblical material, judging
this system and discriminating among its various forms even as it allows him
to evaluate the elements of the sacred story.
These propositions are certainly well worth arguing. It is unfortunate, then,
that Lewalski does not so much argue her case as document it. Since it is "deliberateness" that needs to be shown, Lewalski ought to stress and think
upon the indications of conscious manipulation, those explicit textual signals
by which the genre system is made for the course of Paradise Lost into a rhetoric. Lewalski does underscore obvious generic cues; but all too often, she assumes that the presence of a generic paradigm, or the presence of some
element that might be associated with a paradigm, constitute evidence of
Milton's deliberate use of form. This assumption having been made, the
question then can easily become, "to what end this deliberate use of form?",
and an argument about generic composition and "style" gives way to animpressively indefatigable-exercize in moralizing Milton.
This procedure is especially unsatisfactory when the moralizing argument
clearly dictates the very documentation of genre, as it does for example in
Lewalski's analysis of Milton's God. She begins with the general statement
that God is the most generically multiplicitous character in the poem, and
then makes this claim good in practice by broadening her definition of genre
to the bursting point. One can accept that the dialogue between Father and
Son in Book III is "a species of epic Concilia Deorum," and that this cues us to
the dialogue'S essential generic paradigm. But one cannot agree that the
Son's offer to die for fallen man is romance because it recalls "deeds of brav-
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ery and self-sacrifice inspired by erotic love and noble friendship." Why
reach outside the epic for analogies to such an action? Again, the dialogue of
Father and Son does indeed allude to a scene between Apollo and Phaethon
in Ovid, as Lewalski points out; but an allusion to Ovid does not make Milton's poem metamorphic epic at this point. Lewalski goes on to argue that
the Father-Son exchange is (among other things) tragicomedy (!), forensic debate (a formal genre, she tells us), and finally "a species of Socratic dialogue."
The doors of Lewalski's learned perception are thrown open, and it is festival
time; if he were likened to a lamb in this section, then that would not only
put the Son within the Revelations-genre, it would also make the poem
georgic. Lewalski is conSiderably more accommodating than God is, and the
reason is not far to seek. She wants to impart a slightly new twist to the old
argument about God's proper unrepresentability: God's generic multiplicity,
she tells us, reminds the reader that he cannot really be imagined, but only
approximated to. The argument about Milton's deliberate use of genre here
runs athwart Milton's evident intentions-which should be apparent to anyone familiar with his peculiarly literalist dochine of accommodation, accord-

ing to which it would be heretical and arrogant to distrust the
anthropomorphic self-representations that God, in the Bible, has supplied to
his saints. This theory accounts for what is in fact the comparative nakedness
of Milton's God in Paradise Lost. Lewalski dresses God up, one feels, in order
to cover over Milton's radical and presumptious familiarity with him, and in
order to salvage a more coherent reading than the poem makes available.
More important~ however, than any individual misreadings induced by it,

the procedure that turns a generic into a moralizing argument prevents Lewalski from even raising the question as to how a rhetoric of genres is possible. The concept of such a rhetoric is as much a problem as it is a solution.
Say that Milton does manipulate genre to such coherent ends as Lewalski
proposes; the peculiar and salutary distance from genre that this manipulation
is premissed upon still asks to be accounted for. If one regrets Lewalski's tum
to moral exegesis, that is largely because her learning puts her in a better position than most to exposit the preconditions, and thus to explain the nature,
of Milton's generic practice.
In spite of lapses in the documentary argument, however, and in spite of
the impropriety of the documentary slant, Lewalski's basic proposition is
pretty well enforced. She does make a fairly strong case for the determinate
presence and the deliberate manipulation in Milton's poem of the genresystem associated with and most infiuentially put forward by the younger
Scaliger. Even though she argues that Milton is operating strictly in terms of,
or within, the Renaissance system, her book thus nonetheless raises the ques-

tion of how to relate Milton's indubitable return to the classics, and to classical epic-which takes place against and behind the back, so to speak, of the
official system-with the Renaissance system itself. One may not be able to
see Milton, at least in practice, making the Renaissance mistake of interpret-

ing the Aristotelian hamartia as a character flaw or a sin (a mistake that Lewalski, who should know better, evidently repeats); still, Lewalski makes it
more pressing to ask how Milton's avoidance of such an error was possible,

and that is no inconsiderable accomplishment.
It is less easy to come to terms with Shoaf's Milton, Poet of Duality, partly,
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it should be granted, because he is attempting something fairly new and
strange, at least to Milton criticism. The book concerns numbers (one and
two especially), numerical puns ("impart," "impair," "atone," et. ai,), and
numerically related words ("sign," "justify") in Milton's major poetry-a
cluster that Shoaf calls the "lexicon of duality." Shoaf draws eclectically
upon elements of psychoanalytic and semiotic theory to fashion this numerical diction into a moral discourse centered upon true and false forms of identity. Milton's theology is thus translated into a curious species of
numerological morality-curious mostly because of the emphasis on numbers, but also because this morality proves to have served Dante, Virgil, Plato
(though against his will), Ovid, Chaucer, and other immortal Western artists
before being refined under Shoaf's pen for all varieties of modern humanity
(some groups may possibly have favored access, however; see p. 56, where
Shoaf exonerates himself from the charge of making language Christian by
claiming "only that Christ perfectly understood language-its vicariousness
or mutuality or sacrificiality-and this, in large part, because he was a Jew").
The essential moral propositions would seem to run as follows. If one
wants to be whole or really one (and one does), then one should recognize
that one needs help from another. If one recognizes this, then one will become part of a couple of some sort (whether this means a coupling of one
and language, one and a wife, or one and God or Christ). One must join with
another, must recognize one's duality, must make two, in order to be truly
one, which is also then to be ordered, at least in relation to the second. Truly
to recognize one's duality and be one and ordered always involves sacrifice
(of one's independence, which is evidently presupposed). So unity is attained
only through sacrifice. If one does not sacrifice, or sacrifices· falsely, then . ..
but I begin to feel that it is impossible to summarize this argument without
seeming willfully to parody it, so I will let Shoaf teach false sacrifice, or sin,
in his own words, which are taken from a reading of Sin's speech to Satan
toward the end of Book II of Paradise Lost:
Sin (who is followed by a sign) is a mirror for Satan and his (and everyman's) narcissism. Sin is thus properly defined as a corruption of difference, or, very strictly speaking, of apartness
Through the
imagery of narcissism, Milton is recognizing that sin is the illusion and
confusion in which one attempts to be one without ever becoming two
or different from itself, merely copying itself endlessly instead. (And
this, if we stop to reflect on it, is precisely pride, the chief of sins and
hence the loneliest.) Sin is always a frustration of difference: in the sin
of lust, for example, the difference of the other's body is only an illusion to the lustful, for the lustful wants the other's body as his or her
own and reduces it to his or her own, thereby confusing it with his or
her own.
The problem with such a passage, and with Shoaf's reading of Milton, is
not just that the morality extracted is so general that it can be of little relevance to Milton in particular. Nor is it only that the modern theory alluded to
is almost always used to gloss the content, rather than to explain the form, of
Milton's poem. The bigger problem is that the extreme emphasis upon num-
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bers is properly meaningless. The modern sources from whom Shoaf pulls
his number theory (Lacan, Derrida, Deleuze, et al.) do speak of numbers, it's
true; but in them the numbers are articulated with categories or concepts that
give them a significance they otherwise don't know. Shoaf would seem to
want to tum the relationship between numbers and more substantive concepts around, with results that I believe are unintentionally comic (one imagines Milton deliberating on whether to have his eldest read to him in Latin
again this morning: "If I do it, will we both remain one, and thus three? or
will I be making us into a false duality-just one?") Better, surely, that the
theology go untranslated and unglossed than that it should be submitted to
such ill-informed modem wisdom.
Though I think Shoaf's project is seriously misguided, I would not be taken
to imply that criticism informed by Lacan or Deleuze or Eco ought not to be
directed at Milton. It is just that a cognizant Lacanian analysis, for example,
should approach Milton in a rather different way, making an explanation of
his poetry's ideology and form its object and end, instead of seeking to gloss
it with Lacanian truths (equating Christ's sacrifice, say, with the repression
imposed by the subject's entrance into the Symbolic).
Neither would I leave this book behind without noting that it is strong in
places. Shoaf's argument for Ovid as an influential reference point even for
the later Milton provides an interesting sidelight, and his relation of individual Ovidian myths (Medea, Philomela) to Paradise Lost is inSightful. Again,
the last chapter, on Samson Agonistes, offers a remarkably acute reading of
that tragedy's action, the category of the dual serving here-accidentally, but
usefully-to underscore the play's ambivalent relation to classical tragedy,
and thus to define its singularity as a form. And finally, to note a virtue that
is not incidental but rather central to the book's purpose: while one may
have doubts about the moral discourse Shoaf implicates his "lexicon" in, still
he does demonstrate, I think, that many of these words (e.g., "partner," "impart," "impair") are complex words; or, more precisely, that though they are
not exactly puns, they possess a punning dimension-they might be called
semipuns. Shoaf's moralizing explanation of Milton's frequent use of the
semipun, in his chapter on rhymes and puns, is clearly inadequate; but a
more extensive documentation and bolder explanatory analysis of this characteristic Miltonic figure might yield interesting results.

Bryn Mawr College

Chris Kendrick

American Romanticism and the Marketplace by Michael T. Gilmore. Chicago
and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1985. Pp. ix

+ 177. $19.95.

American romanticism, as a major episode in our literary history, invites
re-reading and re-writing in light of recent developments in critical theory.
New texts, such as John Irwin's American Hieroglyphics: The Symbol of the
Egyptian Hieroglyphics in the American Renaissance (1980) and Carolyn Porter's reading of Emerson in Seeing and Being: The Plight of the Participant Obseroer in Emerson, James, Adams and Faulkner (1981), challenge the
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domination exercised by works like F.O. Matthiessen's American Renaissance
(1942) and Charles Feidelson's Symbolism and American Literature (1953),
which have stood so long as fundamental articulations of the period. Specifically, conceptions of the oppositions between spirit/matter, culture/nature,
self/other, life/death, use/exchange value-components of the symbolic,
psychological and economic systems that are implicated in romantic aesthetic
theory and practice-invite reexamination. With his American Romanticism
and the Marketplace, Michael Gilmore joins those attempting alternative constructions.
Gilmore opens his book with the assertion that "The American romantic
period was the era of the marketplace" (p. I)-an hypothesis which asks us
to see the works of Emerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne and Melville in terms of
the commodification of literature, and to reconsider commonplace notions of

mid-nineteenth century American literary culture as decidedly anti-materialist, a view that defers marketplace issues to the latter half of century. He
points out that the production of a national literature and a market society,
based upon exchange rather than use, are interrelated features exerting profound influences on the themes and forms of American romantic literature.
Writing and publishing were both implicated in this economic revolution,
one effect of which was to transform literary production from "an upper-class
or patrician pursuit," (p. 3) practiced and consumed by a small audience of
like-minded individuals, into an effort to engage a literate mass market readership (Gilmore reminds us that in 1850, ninety percent of the white adult
population in America could read and write). Literature was commodified
and merchandised to engage this reading public.
Gilmore wants to add the transition to an exchange economy to the list of
causes for the tensions and polarities inhabiting American romantic literature.
He claims that, in their major works, Emerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne and
Melville display their ambivalence about the writer's place in the new economic order, and struggle, not too successfully, with the need to accommodate the demands of the new reading public. He argues that Hawthorne and
Melville, fully implicated in the market economy, "eventually succumbed to
the commodifying process. They came to see their readers as adversaries and
their books as alienated objects" (p. 17).
One could say, however, that their concerns with and accommodations to
the marketplace position them, on the one hand, closer to their supposed
opposites and rivals-those women writers who succeeded in producing
works for a mass culture audience, or, through their resistance to the reading
public, on the other hand, closer to the patrician upper class elite. Unfortunately this potentially informative fracture between elite culture and writing
is largely unexamined, remaining a part of the story of American romanticism that Gilmore refuses to re-write. Instead, he tightly circumscribes his
field of investigation and fixes the canonical writers of Matthiessen's American Renaissance at the center. Invoking the common cliche of the "other," the
shadowy specter o(the "scribbling woman" inscribed in the margins of nineteenth century literary culture, he maintains that "the romantics can be excused for feeling that they inhabited a completely separate cultural universe
from the 'scribbling women.' They had reason to excoriate a literary marketplace that proved so inhospitable to their art" (p. 8). The conventional view,
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that" Art" or "Great Literature" is defined oppositionally, by the absence of
market value, stands as an unexamined and controlling assumption.

Still, there are provocative moments in American Romanticism and the Marketplace that will return readers to Gilmore's book. His thesis, more than the
specific readings he offers, could lead us to construct new relationships between texts of the period (these and others), between writers and language,
as well as between literature and economic structure, As it is, the book is
slight. It provokes and frustrates more than it persuades us to revise traditional readings. Further, it is uneven: Gilmore works best with Thoreau and
Melville, but much less effectively with Emerson and Hawthorne.
The treatment of Walden as a modernist text that denounces modernity, a
"defeated text" of agrarian ideals, illustrates the vitality of Gilmore's approach. Pointing out the similarities between Thoreau's critique of the commodification of nature through exchange and Marx's critique of capitalism
with its attendant reification of human social relations, Gilmore sees Walden
as a chronicle of Thoreau's inability to liberate himself completely from the
exchange relations of the marketplace. According to Gilmore, Thoreau is
keenly conscious of the relationship between the commodification of objects
in the marketplace and the commodification of language as symbol. Thoreau
wants "to devise a conception of reading and writing as unalienated labor"
(p. 45), outside the exchange process. The writer and reader are laborers, producers rather than consumers of the text, again in opposition to the writers
and readers of popular literature. What is the relationship between the democraticization of the literary audience and the commodification of literary
works? To telling one's story and to selling it? What is the writerly text of art
as compared with the readerly textof popular literature in mid-nineteenth
century America?
This returns once more to my earlier complaint: the unexamined politics of

literary production in Gilmore's work. His notes suggest some of the sources
one might consult: Marx, Lukacs, Althusser, Benjamin and Barthes. The language of his analYSiS, the terms he uses, suggests the coming together of new
analytical approaches and often read texts, but Gilmore gives us just enough
of this to disappOint. Of Moby-Dick, for example, he writes: "The living
speech of the storyteller vies with 'the death of the author: resulting in the
disappearance of the first-person voice from whole stretches of the narrative.
Moreover, the first-person speaker is himself a more guarded and elusive figure than his air of SOciability suggests. . . . In asking to be called Ishmael. he
comes before the reader not 'in his own proper character' but under a Biblical
pseudonym that expresses his sense of alienation" (p. 126). Here the evocation of Benjamin ("The Storyteller") and Barthes ("The Death of the Author") confuses rather than clarifies. The references remain buzz words,
"imports" not so easily transplatned in the eclectic context of Gilmore's
work. The traces of their relation to a specific, Nother" discourse of contemporary criticism suggest a difference which troubles and unsettles this text.
Gilmore tends to make less rather than more of his observations. Exploring
the question of "authorial removal" in Melville, he present an author who
wants "to orphan the text, to sunder it from an identifiable parent or producer" (p. 126) as a means of obScuring his complicity in the market economy.
The points are not implausible; rather, they are not quite enough. He writes,
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for example, "Moby-Dick is 'The Doubloon' writ large ... an object without
a single, originating maker" (p. 128). He notes that "one has no sense that
Ishmael-or indeed, anyone-has written these pages; lacking a mediating
point of view, they produce the illusion of a text without an author" (p. 128).
Of interest is the illusion, not the absence. The strains of the opposition-accommodation to marketplace interests and resistance in the form of loyalty to
one's art/self-are traced out but never become a productive tension.
Without doubt this vein is a rich one, worth mining. How Ahab, in his
contest with Moby-Dick, aligns himself with Emerson by attempting "to
overcome alienation and reclaim the world for man" (p. 116) is perhaps less
interesting than how Melville aligns himself with Thoreau by constructing a
modernist text in which the seams (semes?) are made visible and the reader
is invited to become a producer. The whale is constructed through many discourses-"scientific, mythological, legal, historical, religious, political, and literary" (p. 127), but it is the property of none. By eluding the systematic and
comprehensive representational claim of a given discourse, it invites our own
construction which, at the same time, we are forced to (re)cognize as always
only another such discursive figure. If Gilmore had read his Melville back to
Thoreau, to the anti-modernist modernist text of Walden, he might have escaped the traditional view of these texts as they are held captive in the familiar predetermining structures of an unquestioned literary historical
progression.
Because Gilmore is so eager to see authorial tension in terms of simple resistance, his controlling view of these writers' ambivalence resolves the texts'
complexities. Having mastered Hawthorne's disappearing act, Melville in The
Confidence-Man epitomizes the technique of "orphaning the text," this time
by detaching language "from the speaking subject": "The multiple con men
of Melville's novel are versions of the artist who tell stories to obtain money
and use language, not to communicate truth, but to obfuscate their motives
and ingratiate themselves with listeners" (p. ISO). What does Melville accomplish through such an elaborate de-centering textual strategy? Certainly it involves more than the simple, predictable reaction to the commodification of
art that Gilmore presents: that by "removing" oneself from the text, the
writer may engage the marketplace without compromising his artistry. Having prepared the ground for analysis, Gilmore gives us a brief paragraph on
the "thematic or psychological correlatives" of the device of apparent "authorlessness." What does it mean- to see "Bartleby, the Scrivener" as "an investigation into the narrative's own unintelligibility to the reader" (p. 132)?
Or to say tht Melville "positions himself . .. as an absence, an inscrutable
blank wall. He disavows the possibility of a personal author-audience relation, taking the alienation of the working class as a figure for his own estrangement from the public" (p. 145)? Melville's choice to align himself with
the elite guard through op/position to the democratised reading public
(never really materialized in Gilmore's text) remains an unexamined feature
of the tensions under consideration. And this "Truth" that the True Artist
would tell in the sanctuary of his invisible heart of hearts remains another
controlling but unexplored mythos in Gilmore's version of American romanticism. It frees him to claim in his "Afterword" that" American romanticism
yields up this final judgment by the writer in his confrontation with the mar-
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ketplace: a literature exchangeable for dollars is a literature not of intimacy
but of revulsion" (p. 152). Thus he closes his work with a statement masquerading as a question: "Is it unreasonable to suppose, then, that the perdurability of the masked and difficult works of American romanticism is itself
a testimony to the power of the market?" (p. 153).
Not every critical work invites the kind of complaint I have been making.
That is, there is a sense in which it is not fair to ask critics to employ some
other approach to their subject than the one they select. Still, Gilmore tries to
get it both ways. He uses just enough post-structuralist terminology to tease
us into expecting something other than what he provides. By tracing the infiltration of marketplace desires for success and money, Gilmore implicitly,
though perhaps unwittingly, blurs the ease with which readers and writers
assert the conventional wisdom of the opposition: there is high, elite art (literature) and there is popular, commercially successful writing (not literature,
not art). This age-old polarity, along with its troublesome distinctions between writer and reader, artist and popularizer, producer and consumer, remains unshaken. I am asking for more rather than less ambiguity-the kind
that might result from an interrogation of the received oppositions hallowed
by the literary historical tradition or an investigation of the position of each
work in its own literary relations of production. Otherwise, the contradictions
Gilmore wants us to see as irresolvable remain pre-settled by how the literary historical tradition has already written American romanticism and its
texts.

University of Alabama

Elizabeth A. Meese

In the Circles of Fear and Desire: A Study of Gothic Fantasy, by William Patrick
Day. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. Pp. xi

+ 208. $17.50.

There is much to recommend William Patrick Day's study of the Gothic
romance. Day's perceptions are usually bright and persuasive, his readings of
individual texts are often insightful, and his style tends to be crisp and clear.
In the Circles of Fear and Desire thus makes an interesting, entertaining contribution to the growing stock of studies of Gothic fantasy.
Following Northrop Frye's lead in The Secular Scripture and operating as an
archetypal critic, Day defines the conventions of the Gothic canon clearly and
intelligently. There is not much in this approach that can't be found in the
studies of Gothic by David Punter, Judith Wilt, Elizabeth MacAndrews, and a
number of other critics, but Day's account is a good one. Operating at the
same time as a Freudian critic, Day provides one of the better accounts of the
psychodynamics of Gothic fantasy, although here again his ideas are not always new. Day concentrates on questions of androgyny, sexual identity, and
sado-masochism; he has less to say about at least one Freudian category-the
uncanny-which has been much cited by other analysts of Gothic (see, for
example, Rosemary Jackson, Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion). Day mentions Freud's concept, identifies it with what he calls "the Gothic effect," but
does not pursue the issue. Nor does he move beyond Freud to, among other
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recent theorists, Jacques Lacan, whose ideas of language and self, symbolism,
the Other, and the mirror stage might be particularly useful for analyzing
such a voyeuristic, mirror-conscious genre as Gothic. Day's most interesting
psychoanalytic insights concern the androgynous nature of character "doubles" and the quest for-or disintegration of-sexual identity. From this
perspective, his readings of The Monk, "Carmilla," and Dracula are especially
compelling.
Day cites Carolyn Heilbrun on literary androgyny and also an essay by
Nina Auerbach, but not her Woman and the Demon. I am not sure that he has
taken full account of recent studies of Victorian sexuality, several of whichin common with Auerbach's book-challenge conventional notions of the
Victorians as particularly repressed, neurotic, or infantile about their "sexual
identities." Day also cites Lawrence Stone and Anthony Wahl, but not
Michel Foucault, Jeffrey Weeks, Vern Bullough, Rosalind Coward, or Peter
Gay, among others.
Partly for these reasons, Day's attempts to operate not just as an archetypal-Freudian critic, but also as a cultural historian, are less than compelling.
Sometimes he seems to believe that he is writing history when he is only repeating one of his psychodynamic theses in historicized language. It may be
true that "the underlying story of the Gothic is ... the story of the imaginative life of the middle class in the nineteenth century" (p. 4), but this is virtually a tautology. The same statement could be made about the realistic
novel, or about any of the other products of "middle class" artists and writers
in the nineteenth century. Relations between Gothic romances and other
"popular" literary forms such as Newgate fiction, the "sensation novels" of
the 1860s, and detective fiction are more asserted than explored historically.
The history which Day tries to write gets even cloudier when he proceeds
to offer a sketchy account of the Gothic in the twentieth century, ranging
from The Great Gatsby and The Sun Also Rises (which contain Gothic touches,
but of course aren't Gothic romances) to such films as King Kong and Halloween. The notion that the Gothic romance had some peculiar hold on the
sexually repressed Victorian imagination (even though the genre was an
eighteenth-century and then a Romantic invention) now balloons into the
perhaps sexually liberated (Day supposes not), hip-about-Freud "modernist"
era. But if the foundation of Gothic is the problematic nature of sexual identity, how can the popularity of Gothic fantasies in three or four distinct eras,
when sexuality and family relations were perhaps qutie distinct, be explained
in historical terms? How do the psychodynamic properties of Gothic fantasies
change, or do they? How can Day's archetypal and Freudian categories account for the quite specific historical popularity of certain Gothic romances,
but not others? Why does Frankenstein still live in the popular imagination,
but not Uncle Silas? Or, giving Hollywood its Gothic due, why has King Kong
been such a mass culture "hit," while such an excellent Gothic film as The
Other, based on the Thomas Tryon novel, has dropped from sight?
In fairness to Day, the problem of writing a history of Gothic fantasy is a
complicated one. Day's archetypal-Freudian categories are themselves ahistorical, so that any critic starting from such a perspective will not find it easy
to operate as a historian. Further, the Gothic romance itself abuses or ignores
norms of historical accuracy and probability. It thus isn't surprising that there
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haven't been many very good historical explanations of its popularity (David
Punter's The Literature of Terror is perhaps the one recent exception). But
there are several interesting biographical-historical explanations for particular
Gothic romances, and these might serve as at least beginning points for a history. Day cites Kate Ellis's essay in The Endurance of Frankenstein, and some
of the other essays in that volume are part of what I have in mind. I am
thinking also of Fredric Jameson on "magical narratives" and on Conrad in
The Political Unconscious, Terry Eagleton and Gilbert and Gubar on the
BTantes, Carol Senf on Dracula and "the New Woman" in Victorian Studies
(26: 33-49), and Ed Block's "James Sully, Evolutionist Psychology, and Late
Victorian Gothic Fiction" in the same journal (VS 25: 443-67). These essays
may not provide completely satisfactory historical accounts of their subjects,
but their authors are asking the right questions,
In the Circles of Fear and Desire is, then, a mix of critical and historical
ideas, ranging from the sharp and original to the fuzzy and repetitious. There
are some inaccuracies, which perhaps correspond to Day's occasional haste to
overgeneralize (Uncles Silas's son, for example, and not Silas kills "Madame"
in Le Fanu's novel, and her name is not "Rougerrie" but "de la Rougierre").
At the same time, there are numerous astute, often witty critical perceptions
and analyses of individual texts which make the book enjoyable. Like much
psychological and archetypal criticism, Day's study leaves a good deal to be
desired as history, but is still worth reading for anyone interested in Gothic
fantasy.

Indiana University-Bloomington

Patrick Brantlinger

The Theoretical Dimensions of Henry James by John Carlos Rowe. Madison:
The University of Wisconsin Press, 1984. Pp. xv

+ 288. $24.00

Henry James: FictiOll As History edited by Ian F. A. Bell. London: Vision Press,
1985. Pp. 188. $27.50.
The two books under review reflect the change in recent criticism: the return of history from its long exile during the successive reigns of the New
Criticism, structuralism, and post-structuralism. The emphasis on the social
embeddedness of all modes of discourse in specific political, economic, and
cultural formations has imparted an uncanny quality to the current moment.
The return of the repressed has not only made familiar authors unfamiliar,
but has also prompted new allegiances in critics previously committed to the
old regime. Whereas in the 70s floating signifiers and absent centers commanded attention, now it is their genealogy as productions of discursive
practices and their status in the rhetoric of cultural representation that are
likely to be examined. In short, Derrida is displaced by Foucault, Glyph by
Representatiolls.
Literature's great formalists present the richest and uncanniest opportunities for revisionism, and few major figures have been so frequently defamiliarized of late as Henry James. "To render uncanny the high modernist
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avowed intention, and he aims to do so

by "socializing" the novelist "whose destiny always seems to end in the intricacies of his late style and its retreat from life into the palace of art" (p. 28).
Rowe's "antiformalist enterprise" seeks to transform the "essentially subjective, interpersonal, and intrinsic issues of James's fiction into the sociohistorical questions that, even as they exceed the literary text's formal boundaries,
are the proper ends of literature" (p. 25). Rowe conceives his book as a critical reading of American deconstruction, a method he finds vitiated by its tendency to make a "too simple and too strict distinction" between literature
and society, a binary opposition dear to the New Criticism and to the "romantic mythology" of modem art in general (pp. 120-121). Since his previous works established him as a well-known proponent of Derridean
deconstruction, Rowe's current emphasis is not without its irony. His Fou-

caultian stress here on the "power struggles of language, history, and culture" hopes to widen deconstruction's scope so to achieve the important aim

of socializing James.
Although these aims are sufficiently ambitious to sustain a book, they constitute only part of Rowe's project, whose larger goal is to read James's "theoretical potential": the novelist is "used as a point of reference" for
evaluating various contemporary theoretical approaches-feminism, marx-

ism, the psychology of influence, phenomenology, psychoanalysis, and
reader-response criticism. In six chapters (one for each item on his list) he deconstructs each of these methods while insisting that his deconstruction is
"critical and productive," "coordinating" different approaches rather than
eliminating them as do most American deconstructors in their aggressive ex-

clusion of the values and concepts of predecessors and competitors. The determining of a "certain limitation, which requires the perspective of a
supplementary henneneutic" describes Rowe's "narrative mobility," as "a

subsequent strategy of interpretation ... becomes the subject and method of
the subsequent chapter" (pp. 256, 24).
The main problem with this exceedingly busy and self-conscious book is
that, as Rowe conceives them, his twin efforts at socializing James and evalu-

ating theory are at cross purposes. The effect of this confusion is that James
and history are diminished, a double reduction nowhere more egregious than

at the conclusion of chapter one. Here Rowe inadvertently makes clear why
he can't make good on his abundant talk of opening up the sociohistorical,
political, and social dimensions of James. This goal is unrealized because
James's primary role in the book, as Rowe blithely confesses, is to serve as
the "manikin on which the drapery of contemporary theory will be modeled
and where problems of fit will be confronted by this latter-day deconstructive
tailor" (p. 28). Immediately prior to this ominous image, which borrows
Henry Adams' manikin, Rowe the tailor had severely cropped the fabric of
history: "The 'history' with which we are concerned in this book is our own

recent history in the humanities." The succeeding chapters are hampered by
the conflicting and attenuated aims delineated in the first. Yet it is a tribute to
Rowe's acuteness as a close reader of James that his book manages to be as
valuable as it is, despite its inability to surpass the fonnalism it denounces.
If his methodological experiment is problematic, Rowe's local readings,

particularly of The Bostonians, "The Tum of the Screw," and The Princess
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Casamassima are provocative. His analysis of this last text illustrates both the
strengths and problems of the book as a whole. Although the chapter on
"The Marxist Critique of Modernism and The Princess Casamassima" seeks to
carry his argument "fully into the social domain," here, as elsewhere, the
"social domain" turns out to be confined to the level of literary form, which
is shown to enact, through narrative strategies, political and social themes.
Rowe's socializing of James is a wholly literary activity with little or no attempt to connect his texts to the web of intellectual and cultural affiliations
that partly comprise the novelist's historical moment. Instead, Rowe's energy
is spent in socializing James in terms of Fredric Jameson's formulations regarding the ideology of form. What makes this chapter interesting, however,
is not the application of jameson's formal typologies, but rather Rowe's challenge to Jameson's "caricature" of James as the "exemplar of formalism" and
decadent aestheticism, whose perspectivist realism makes him a mystified
celebrant of the ideology of individualism (pp. 159, 164). This Marxist mythology of James can be criticized from a number of viewpoints, and not surprisingly Rowe conducts a formal reading to demonstrate that James's
realism is hardly the self-evident and unproblematic mode that Jameson
takes it to be. By creating a "disturbance within the customary narrative of
realism," James deconstructs the ideology of form that governs realism, and
his novel exposes "throughout that such 'realism' depends upon the effective
repression of contradictions .... The formal structure of the novel is the representation of such contradiciton" (p. 186). The virtue of Rowe's reading is
that it shows us James neither as defensive aesthete nor political conservative
but rather an adept critic of the "subtle arts of ideological mystification."
James's "intimate understanding" of the complexities of cultural selfrepresentation is rooted in what Rowe calls the "profoundly radical depths in
his own political thinking" (p. 187), a striking insight that Rowe barely develops. And yet, James's radicalism is precisely what needs to be clarified,
specified, and historicized if Rowe is genuinely to accomplish his goal of
"questioning the ways in which James has been mythologized as the master
of. life-denying estheticism" (p. 28).
This goal, I think, remains the most crucial one to pursue in James studies,
despite the fact that recent work, including Ian Bell's collection Henry James:
Fictioll as History, has put a political inflection on familiar Jamesian themes
and techniques. The politicizing of james (by Carolyn Porter, j. C. Agnew,
and Mark Seltzer, among others) has had a paradoxical effect: while it has
served the useful purpose of breaking "the seal of historical solipsism and idiosyncrasy surrounding him" (in Agnew's phrase), it has also reaffirmed
James as anti political. Whether guided by Lukacs, Marx, or Foucault, recent
historical readings end up resembling Jameson's image of James the conservative elitist. Bell's anthology exemplifies this paradox to the point of sabotaging its advertised aim of refuting the conventional wisdom that believes in
the "negativity of James' own politics." Although Bell's preface claims that
his collection will shm.v James's oeuvre as demonstrating "exactly the opposite of such supposed negativity," the essays by Millicent Bell, Nicola Bradbury, and Maud Ellman blatantly allegorize James and thus dehistoricize
him. The one essay in the volume that manages persuasively to ground
James directly in the material circumstances of his time is Stuart Culver's
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study of the Prefaces and their relation to James's increasingly professionalized sense of authorship based on a new model "engendered by copyright
statutes and the changing technologies of the literary marketplace" (p. 135).
The most ambitious piece in the collection, Richard Godden's "Some Slight
Shifts in the Manner of the Novel of Manners," is, for all its flair, most interesting as evidence of the inability of Marxists to locate James in any critical
relation to his age. Godden endorses John Goode's claim of twenty years ago
that James is "saturated in the values of capitalism; in its metaphysical notions of a substantial self/' and attempts to substantiate this with the same
dubious evidence Goode has used-James's letter to Grace Norton urging her
to "be as solid and dense as you can." Goode and Godden pounce on this as
proof of James's allegiance to an atomized bourgeois ego; they completely
ignore that in consoling a grieving woman, James went on to say: "we all live
together ... we help each other ... we lighten the effort of others ... make
it possible for others to live." That James's letter suggests a notion of self
both monadic and fluid is less contradictory than indicative of James's fundamental belief in the self as an intersubjective process that depends on Otherness to constitute its own identity. Godden's claim that the "disintegral self
has no appeal to James" (p. 179) ignores that James values "the saving virtue
of vagueness/' which has no investment in the bourgeois ideals of stability
and sincerity, and ignores too how often James dramatizes the calamities that
engulf those who conceive themselves authentic and autonomous. Far from
supporting the "integrative selfhood" of leisure class manners (Godden's
terms), James offers a powerfully dialectical critique of the bourgeois subject,
for he affirms a limited and precarious freedom by showing that the individual's capacity for creative expression is inextricable from his alienated status
in the object world of capitalist social relations. Godden sees none of these
complexities, and prefers to conclude with the familiar verdict: James's "defense of the 'solid' and 'dense' is a form of self-defense, indicating how narrow is his affiliation to one moment of capital and to the uses made of that
moment and of that capital by a particular leisure class" (p. ISO). But the narrowness is all Godden's. In 1904 this allegedly leisure class snob immerses
himself in New York's "dense Yiddish quarter" and visits Ellis Island where
he recognizes and accepts "the affirmed claim of the alien" as the image of
his own alien identity as "restored absentee." James and the immigrant confront the "assimilative force" of what he calls the "hotel spirit" of modern
democracy. In his year long repatriation James encounters and analyzes a
"thousand forms of this ubiquitous American" spirit, whose hegemony Max
Weber would describe a year later as the "iron cage" of instrumentality and
rationalization in which dwells; "the spirit of capitalism."
As Bells' volume attests, the image of James the genteel formalist persists,
a caricature as durable as any in American literary history dating back to
Charles Beard, Parrington, and Van Wyck Brooks in the twenties and thirties,
revived in Maxwell Geismar's hysterical diatribe of the sixties, and continued
by Jameson and others in the eighties. Rowe's energetic if unsatisfying effort
to chip away at this well-entrenched mythology is a step in the right direction. The next step might be simpler than Rowe's intricate methodological
machinery would permit: to reread the book that remains among the most
penetrating works of American social and cultural analysis yet written-The
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American Scene. However improbable it may seem, in this report of his 1904
visit to America, James takes his place with two of the great social theorists
of the late nineteenth century-Georg Simmel and Max Weber-and anticipates two of the crucial theorists of the next century-Marcuse and Adorno.
Confronting this underappreciated work and the constellation of which it is
part might begin to measure the "radical depths" of this uTIcan,ny genius.

University of Washington

Ross Posnock

Modernism and Authority: Strategies of Legitimation in Flaubert and Conrad by
Mark Conroy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985. Pp. ix +
193. $20.00.
Coercion to Speak: Conrad's Poetics of Dialogue by Aaron Fogel. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1985. Pp. 284. $29.50.
Both Mark Conroy's Modernism and authority: Strategies of Legitimation in
Flaubert and Conrad and Aaron Fogel's Coercion to Speak: Conrad's Poetics of
Dialogue are major, original studies of Conrad and the theory of fictional narrative generally. Conroy argues that Flaubert and Conrad found themselves
in a legitimative quandary, like their emergent middle class readers in the
nineteenth-century. The writer could appeal to his actual audience, the reading public, or to a "higher" tribunal such as posterity or a select band of
other artists as the chosen few who will judge his work. The rage for legitimation comes from an Oedipal lack of proper paternity, which is the source
of legitimation, prohibition, and guilt. The infant's claim to be heard, its first
legitimate cries, embodies the contradiction between expression and repression, appeals to the code transmitted by parental authority, and puts the
child in the role of usurper, having to justify itself to its parents and through
them to larger society. The act of speech defines the eccentric position of the
speaker toward the code. The language-giving father occupies the space of
authority and judgment. The child exists in some other space, an alien. The
code applies both to intelligibility and to behavior, for example as Conrad's
Marlow is the understander of Kurtz's tale and also embodies a standard of
conduct. Language is a structure of domination. One of the most effective
methods of legitimating such a structure is to appeal to tradition, but nineteenth century democratic movements opened all traditional values to constant reassessment and disputation. Basing his argument on the work of
Jurgen Habennas and Hans-Georg Gadamer, Conroy maintains that Flaubert
and Conrad demonstrate the need of the whole nineteenth-century to "revivify fatherhood as a metaphor for the new, more impersonal structures of authority of the time" (p. 27), which links together the micropolitical situation
of each novelist and the macropolitics of the nineteenth-century generally.
The completely deracinated authors, Flaubert and Conrad, needed to legitimate their utterances in the fatherless genre, the novel. Conrad's creation of
a storyteller and his dramatic audience within his texts is a nostalgic appeal
to a time when the sense of the community was stronger and the storyteller
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had his proper seat at the hearth, rather than merely an alien commercial
writer appealing to an anonymous reading public. Conrad's plots, too, often
express his need to "personify, and so humanize, an impersonal and pitiless
process [of imperial rule as well as creative writing] and to retrieve patriarchal authority to justify one's powers" (p. 91)-in Lord Jim, Nostromo, Heart

of Darkness.
Like Conroy, Fogel occupies himself with the motives and impulses moving the author to the act of writing. Fogel, too, sees Conrad as an heir of
Oedipus. He sees the key to Sophocles' drama to be the punishment inflicted
upon the speech forcer. He speculates that an Athenian audience would see
in the play the dramatic embodiment in Oedipus of the judicial power of
coercion to speak and that the legitimacy of that power is proved when it recoils on the speech forcer. The "secular logos" of the play is "legal institutional power to make the other talk and bear witness to the community" (p.
227). The uncanny parallel between the speech forcing sphinx and Oedipus
is reflected in many everyday situations in real life-judges in court, teachers
in the classroom, parents addressing children, a Freudian analyst interrogating a patient, and so on. It is a central situation, Fogel would argue the central situation, in Conrad's fiction. For example, consider the interrogation
under torture of Hirsch by Sotillo in Nostromo. The Oedipal dialogue creates
a ritual in which the hidden agenda is the destruction of the inquisitor, as in
the transcripts of the McCarthy hearings, the opening of King Lear, Kafka's
Trial, or when Derrida sees a text analyzing and interrogating itself until it
bursts like an empty bubble. The dominant humanist assumption in modern
Europe has been that dialogue must be free, unforced, democratic, to be liberating. Fogel denies this view for Conrad, stating "that to ,be 'human' is not
to be free in dialogue, as in Renaissance and modern 'humanism,' but to be
immersed either in a polis or in an imperial tangle of polities, and therefore to
be caught in multiple forms of dialogue as coercion" (p. 232). Conrad's fictions are built, according to Fogel, out of scenes dramatizing disproportional
and coerced dialogue such as filibuster, yarn, inquisition, abnormal silence,
overhearing, and operatic ensembles. Typically such scenes in Conrad displaya structure based on his sense of motion or rhythm, which Fogel characterizes as "rest, unrest, arrest." Fogel borrows from Mikhail Bakhtin the term
anacrisis for these scenes of forcing another to speak.
When critics focus on the author's motives, his intention, or the whim that
generates his language, it is not surprising that their explanations sometimes
appear whimsical. The reader of the critic may well wonder what sort of verification is appropriate to the kinds of assertions being made here. What rules,
if any, should be brought to critical books of this kind to test the truth content of their arguments? In Fogel, for example, the concept of "chime" is very
important so that the word must (that is, to be compelled to some act) chimes
with the word muster (to muster the crew). Like the text of a contemporary
"language poet" or the lists of etymologically connected words in Gerard
Manley Hopkins' notebooks, chimed connections seem to indicate subliminal
connections in the author's mind dictating to some degree his lexical selection and the structure of his scenes. Onomastic practices, like those employed
when Dickens names his pedagogue "Gradgrind," reflect such connections.
What is the reader to make, however, of assertions like the following: "The
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name Lingard means, to Conrad's overhearing of English, lingering guardianship ... No matter that the name was real: Conrad gives it an allegorically
contractual meaning: colonialism is lingering guardianship" (p. 45). Grant
that the name Lingard "means" lingering guardian and a plausible, coherent
reading emerges. Lena means "leaner" or a dependent person (p. 134). Heyst
means in German "to be named" (p. 144). A highly gymnastic onomastic
produces a commodity, a critical text, fit for consumption by an academic audience. But, similarly to Kurtz in Africa, is there not some danger from a lack
of restraint in such a reader? Why not read Lingard backwards and find in
drag nil (Latin nil or nihil being an example of the sort of polysemic polyglossia noted by Fogel) the true "meaning" of the fiction. Lingard is shown as a
man who drags nothing with him, neither dependents nor cultural history a
totally alienated hero finally. Giddy with this formulation (which is nowhere
suggested by Fogel and is presented here merely as a comic reductio), the
reader may go on to read the name Nostromo backwards as Of mort son, again
reflecting in reverse the action of the novel, where Nostromo is killed in the
final scenes by his potential father-in-law and so is properly lamented as the
dead son. It would make the joke tedious to continue this plausibly Oedipal
analysis. The serious issue here is what kind of verification critical arguments
require.
On first reading of Fogel's book, it appears full of sparkling suggestions
and insights, but overbold in its claims and necessarily merely speculative.
On one levet it certainly is a demonstration of what it argues: that all dialogue is caught in disproportionate power networks and replays the interrogation of Teiresias by Oedipus. The book comes to us with the authority of a
university press and an academic system, which is the very system compelling us to reply, to counter, to feint as we read. On another level, the book
makes assertions about Conrad's meaning which seem to be "accidental,"
implausible, unacceptable, rather like Stan Fish's turning the last names of
Kenyon College's English faculty into an ingenious metaphysical poem. What
kind of proof can be adduced to show that some local Episcopal spirit of
Gambier has not ordained that onomastic poesy? Yet my intuition is very
strong that Stan Fish has gone too far here and that Fogel's "lingering guardian" is also somehow unreasonable.
Since my intuition seems to contradict Fogel's assertion about the "meaning" of Lingard, there must be a distinction somewhere lacking in our dialogue. I suspect that the missing distinction which makes our disagreement
possible resides in the word "meaning" as quoted above (p. 45) or, for example, when Fogel refers to the "invoice" for ivory sent downstream by Kurtz
in Heart of Darkness: "The polysemous word Invoice here means something
roughly equivalent to 'inscape' in Hopkins, but the force is more political and
moral. Marlow from this point onward goes mad with 'Invoice' as the world
is mad with 'Ivory' " (p. 57). In such an assertion the abrasion between Fogel
and his reader becomes acute. What actually does Hopkins mean by "inscape"? Is the in- formation of "inscape parallel with that of "invoice"?
Does "invoice" really" chime" with "ivory"? A host of such questions seems
to be generated out of the turbulant encounter of reader with Fogel's text and
they seem to demand some sort of procedure of verification. What kind of
evidence needs to be adduced to answer such questions and restore a harmonious balance between reader and text?
I
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No one these days imagines Hmeaning" in spatial metaphors, to be contained in language as water is contained in a glass in definite amount, shape,
and quality. On the other hand, many readers will find it disturbing to be
told that lIinvoice" means something like "inner voice" and probably even
more disturbing to be blandly confronted with Hopkins' "inscape" as having
a commonly agreed upon meaning providing the basis for a clear understanding of its correlative meaning in Conrad's "invoice." Why is there this
feeling of disturbance or turbulance in running through Fogel's criticism? Perhaps when Fogel says that A "means" B, the word "mean" should be broken
into several distinct concepts. "Means" in Fogel apparently means: (1) suggests to me on a purely personal and private basis; (2) will suggest to all educated, English, middle-class readers today; (3) ought to suggest to all
educated, English, middle-class readers today; (4) once might have suggested
to educated, English, middle-class readers at the tum of this century; and so
on. I will readily grant that "Lingard" means '1ingering guardian" under
heading (1) above, provided Fogel will allow me under the same heading to
let "Lingard" mean "drag nil." But, of course, heading (1) leads to the modernist solipsism of language in which no communication from one private
world to another is possible. The dialogue between Fogel's printed book and
my response implies that we are seeking a common ground of understanding, under something like heading (3) above. He wants us to understand the
meaning his way. My volition does not always coincide with his. A community of interest requires us to agree on certain procedures and conventions
necessary for arriving at agreed, verifiable understandings of texts. It appears
likely that a printed page is a stimulating code to which every reader brings a
set of mental screens and protocols allowing him or her to generate meaning.
Meaning is not a static entity, but a dynamic relation created by the action of
each mind on the code. Each mind will carry somewhat different screens and
so produce a range of private meanings, but the restraints of social life require that each reader struggle to find the common, the agreeable procedure
(or creating meaning. For example, we agree to read from left to right in English as a pragmatic way to produce meaning from the code, and so it is
merely ludicrous to do the opposite and tum "Lingard" into "grad nil" and
IINostromo" into "O! mort son." Likewise, when we read a text there is an
ongoing process which opens and closes possibilities. When we read "ling,"
the next letters might be "ering," but when we read "linga" we know that
the possibility of "lingering" must be rejected. Fogel appears to me to be
talking about reading a text in the light of excluded possibilities. It is likely
that many readers in fact will go through the process of excluding the word
"lingering" when they read "Lingard" letter by letter from left to right and
that some trace of that exclusion will color the next steps in the process of
their developing meaning from the code, but this procedure of exclusion is
not the same as determining the static and permanent normative meaning of
a text claimed in Fogel's mode of analysis.
Both of these works should be read by all serious students of Conrad and
of modem literary theory. Both show great ingenuity. Although their total
arguments are too complex to be adequately summarized in a short review,
they open the question of how meaning is mapped onto a text and how a
work of fiction can be related to the real situation of author and of audience.
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Beasts of the Modern Imagination: Darwin, Nietzsche, Kafka, Ernst, and Lawrence
by Margot Norris. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985. Pp.
xii + 265. $26.50.
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Beasts of the Modern Imagination must certainly be a good book, since, although it starts from premises that I find distasteful and regard as untenable,
it still manages to include much material that I am obliged to admit is interesting. The book veers back and forth between the scholarly and the autobiographical modes, perhaps in the laudable ambition of making criticism more
personal and less formal, Of, perhaps, merely in order to prove, in standard
Derridean fashion, that the formal cannot be detached from the personal.
Whether it carries out these various manoeuvres tactfully or gracefully is
something for the individual reader to decide, but it is certainly a learned
book. The decision whether there can be such a thing as an "autotelic" art
(e.g., p. 12, 80, 99), or an art that can dispense with meaning (pp. 17, 169,
222-223, 225), is perhaps also a reflection of the school of criticism to which
one belongs rather than a matter for dispassionate (sic) discussion. In any
case, the author confesses that she has fallen short of her own ideal, the ideal
of the autotelic and the meaningless: she confides in the reader, touchingly,
that the objective which eluded her "most fully was the invention of a bestial
'voice' or 'style.' " (p. 196). No doubt the book would have been very different had she succeeded: nevertheless, the fact remains that the first beast has
yet to write the first book on "ferity."
The chapters I liked best were those devoted to Darwin, Nietzsche, and
Ernst, but the Ernst chapter is valuable for its qualities as standard art criticism rather than for its demonstration of any particular "bestiality" on Ernst's
part. The Kafka chapters seemed merely to invert the common idealist interpretation of that author. The content of the Lawrence and Hemingway chapters appeared largely self-evident; the Lawrence chapter did little to identify
the special beauty of Lawrence's style, still unnamed.
After the "Introduction: The Biocentric Tradition," Prof. Norris goes on to
a sympathetic account of "Darwin's Reading of Nature." In this chapter there
might have been more acknowledgment that Darwin did have predecessors
in the recognition of man's mechanical and animal functions, predecessors
such as La Meltrie, or even La Rochefoucauld. In the following chapter,
"Darwin, Nietzsche, Kafka, and the Problem of Mimesis," the author might
also have acknowledged (p. 55) Schiller's primacy over Nietzsche in the argument that life is marked by opulence and waste, profligacy rather than
penury. This chapter does, however, contain a valuable analysis of imitation,
as well as of the role of the audience (d. p. 135). The first part of Chapter 4,
"Nietzsche's Ecce Homo: Behold the Beast" provides a useful account of
Nietzsche's critique of Darwin; the second part has abundant gusto and
empathy for the chapter's stated subject. Nietzsche reveals himself as the actor behind his various masks, "one who 'acts' spontaneously, like a participant in a festival, rather than mimetically. And he restores to his mise en
scene the fugitive light, wind, and temperature that eluded even the Impressionists" (p. 98).
In Chapter 5, "The Fate of the Human Animal in Kafka's Fiction," Norris
denies that asceticism represents a positive value for Kafka. In relation to
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"The Hunger Artist," she offers a striking selection of the grotesque passages
about food "that dot Kafka's personal writings" (p. 116). The thesis of the
second Kafka chapter, on "Josephine, the Singer or the Mouse Folk," seems
to be that in his last work Kafka "outwits his defiant readership by writing a
narrative that consumes itself in the telling" (p. 118). Norris introduces a
lovely quotation from Nietzsche that could almost be out of Kafka himself.
"The human may well ask the animal one day, 'Why do you not talk to me
of your bliss and only look at me?' The animal really wants to answer and
say: 'It comes of always forgetting right away what I wanted to say.' But it
forgot even this answer and was mute: so that the human could only wonder" (p. 119). On the whole, though, Norris's attempt in this chapter to force
Kafka's position towards "radical animality" (p. 125) seems to me even more
pointless than the opposite strategy.
The next chapter is concerned with Max Ernst's "philosophical dismantling
of form" (pp. 143, 149). It contains very good analyses of "La Femme 100
tetes" (p. 146) and "Une Semaine de bont"" (e.g., p. 164). It has interesting
things to say about the difference between the roles of temporality and identity in literature and in the visual arts (p. 148), and points out Ernst's curiosity about Hopi civilization (p. 149). There seems to be a potential
contradiction, though, between the assertion that Ernst restores the "libidinal
matter" to art (p. 149), and the observation that he is not really a primitivist
but, rather, "decadent" (see p. 153 as well as p. 159).
I find little that refreshes Lawrence for me in chapter 8, or Hemingway in
chapter 9. Norris's criticism of Hemingway rests on the contention that what
is important to Hemingway is not violence itself, but the representation of
violence (p. 219). On the other hand, why Hemingway ought to have felt an
obligation to luxuriate in real violence is not clear to me either; nor do I understand why Professor Norris should find it necessary to suppress her own
pity for animals (p. 195), any more than I understand why she should feel
guilty about having failed to invent (her own word) a "bestial 'voice' " for
herself (p. 196).
The "Conclusion: The Biocentric Tradition in Context" recovers some interesting themes from the earlier parts of the book, particularly the attack on
metaphor (p. 224; d., for instance, p. 84), and attempts a synoptic comparison of biocentric with anthropocentric theories. (At any moment, one expects
to hear the voices of Naphta and Settembrini again, as the debate between
vitalism and humanism erupts once more in this new Magic Mountain). Darwin is also revisited: "Given its unflattering implications for human nature,
natural selection as an explanation for biological development and human origin is not likely to have been produced by human desire (with its cultural
configuration and aims) but reqUired the most impartial and disinterested response to exotic and alienating Nature of the kind Darwin encountered on
his travels" (p. 221). I myself confess to a certain irreverent preference for C.
L. Lewontin's less elevated suggestion in "Darwin, Mendel and the Mind"
(NYRB 32 October 10, 1985, 18-23) that Darwin may have arrived at his
theory of differential survival "for reasons external to scientific reasoningfor example that his income was largely derived from stocks (largely railroad
shares) which he actively traded and whose rise and fan he followed daily,
and with considerable care, in the newspaper" (ibid., p. 20).
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Unfortunately, I cannot bring myself to consider everything with which I
differ in this book in a similarly casual or humorous spirit. Without dwelling
on the persistent infatuation of French, and consequently American, thought
with Nietzsche, I cannot help observing that some of the most unsavory corollaries that sometimes accompany Nietzschean thinking appear in this book.
It was long considered unfashionable to regard Nietzsche as a proto-Nazi or
to blame him for the adoption of some of his ideas by the Nazis. I am far
from suggesting any analogy, but I do find some of the things that Ms. Norris chooses to do with Nietzsche disquieting. Have we really been so short of
beasts among men in our time that we have to go in search of more, or create
more? Learned as it is, this book seems unaware that the "Lebensphilosophie"
which it espouses was a familiar element in proto-Nazi thinking, and enunciated in much the same set of slogans as this book's. Norris preaches that we
should "return from our imaginative life in deferred dreams and aspirations
to the eternal now of our bodies and our living vitality. The beasts of the
modern imagination teach us only what we already know and what is, in any
event, entirely tautological: that life is, above all, life" (p. 238). Disinterred
from among my notes taken in a course on 20th century German literature in
1945, the following passage confronts me: "Life-philosophy consists of the
following: the substitution of life for understanding as the fundamental ontological layer, and the derivation of the intellectual and the spiritual from
that." ("Lebensphilosophie besteht darin, an Stelle des Verstandes das Leben
als die ontologische Grundschicht anzusetzen und nun von hier aus das Intellektuelle and Geistige abzuleiten." Fritz Heinemann, Neue Wege der Philosophie [(Leipzig, 1929J, p. 158. Cf. Norris, p. 8). Stefan George, Heinrich
Mann, even the Thomas Mann of the Betrachtungen, demonstrate that the intellectual does not necessarily remain detached from popular doctrines glorifying irrationality, violence, and Blut and Boden. What may seem a harmless
academic exercise today, an innocent form of German vitalism weirdly redisseminated by a French Algerian Jew, may become interwoven with the prevalent fundamentalism, xenophobia, and political reaction of our time to
become the nightmare of tomorrow. I wish I could help remembering, when
I read Norris's repeated insulting references to the "life-denying culture" (p.
169) which she longs to see "abolished," that not so long ago an insignificant
playwright succeeded in immortalizing himself with a single line: "When I
hear the word Culture, I slip the safety-catch off my Browning." ("Wenn ich
Kultur hore, entsichere ich meinen Browning." Hanns Johst, Schlageter:
Schauspiel [Munchen, Albert Langen/Georg Muller, 1933J, p. 26).
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The Forms of Violence: Narrative in Assyrian Art and Modern Culture by Leo
Bersani and Vlysse Dutoit. New York: Schocken Books, 1985. Pp. viii + 136.
$19.95.
Not only an extraordinary contribution to the study of Assyrian art, The
Forms of Violence is a dazzling, often acrobatic meditation on Freud, violence,
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and (preeminently narrative) representation as well. It focusses many of the
ideas that have dominated Bersani's long engagement with psychoanalytic
thought, and brings them to bear on a textual field outside the orbit of contemporary criticism, the palace reliefs drawn from the work of the 9th to the
7th centuries B. C. now displayed at the British Museum. Displacing our attention, and attempting to articulate a positive alternative to the ways in
which Western culture has managed desire through the representation of violence, the book is controversial in many ways: first as a critique of Assyrian
art, which it appears to see with virtually new eyes; second as a rereading of
Freud in line with the work of Laplanche and others; third as a critique of
our culture and its perhaps unintended but pervasive obsession with violence; and fourth as a polemic against narrative itself, which the authors see
as responsible for sustaining and encouraging a cultural receptivity to such
violence.
The shock among Assyriologists might be buffered by the elaborate idiosyncrasy of the methodology. The micro-analysis undertaken by the authors
concentrates not so much on details as on the details of details, and on elements that traditional iconographic and narratively-oriented analysis purposely ignores. They attend to formal elements rather than to "complete"
representations, and to the spaces "between" forms, the "direction" in which
forms lead the eye, and so forth. Where previous criticism has seen in the
palace reliefs an obsession with cruelty and violence, a suppressed or deadened subjectivity, confusion and political reaction-"Subjects of only peripheral human interest transmit a message of repellent violence," as the authors
summarize the idees re~us-they see a principle of marginality and vagrancy,
a desire to subvert narrative, to distract the eye from central subjects, to particularize the subject, to mobilize interpretive attention and even, in effect, to
de-claw the lion through what they at one point call "an astonishingly tender
violence" in which, for example, horses do not trample as much as "cradle"
the fallen enemy troops beneath their hooves. At no point is a specific narrative scene engaged as such. I suspect that the extraordinary novelty of the interpretation as well as the "irresponsibility" of the methodology will
encourage a quick dismissal of the entire work by the community of scholars
professionally engaged with the Assyrian palace reliefs.
But this should not trouble either the authors, who virtually parade their
amateur standing, or the rest of us, most of whom know nothing and care
less about Assyrian art in the first place. For what the authors intend is not
so much to reorient Assyrian studies as to orient the occidental narrative paradigm. They detect in the palace reliefs a counter- or anti-narrative energy
that resists the ways in which narrative hierarchizes, centralizes, effaces and
forecloses. Indeed, they argue that the narrative predisposition is precisely
what accounts for the Western revulsion in the presence of Assyrian art. To
the authors, the astonishing and redundant violence of this art constitutes a
reduction of narrative to its essence, a fascination with acts of violence. But
on closer inspection-and it is hard to imagine human eyes undertaking an
inspection any closer-the reliefs enact, they contend, an artful subversion of
that essence, disclosing the possibility of something outside narrative and violence. The repetition or fonnalization of figures, for example, suppresses differences crucial to a narrative reading and produces an emphasis on
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"countemarrative organizations and identifications" (p. 9). Finally, the palace
reliefs "are particularly instructive about a kind of sliding between narrative
and nonnarrative modes of organization in perception and thought" (p. 14),
and this sliding has doubly confounded those who, condemning the reliefs
for inadequate narrativity, reveal thereby both the inadequacy of narrative to
account for this art, and their own inability to perceive in any other than a
narrative way.
The countemarrative argument leans heavily on a critique of Freud, in
whose thought a new, speculative energy has recently been discovered and
foregrounded, particularly by Lacan and Laplanche. Bersani has been perhaps the foremost American theoretician associated with the unearthing of
this new Freud, and this book is his most ingenious and mature work in this
area. The arguments are patiently worked out and resist condensation or paraphrase, but the center of all the essays on psychoanalytic thought in this
book is the notion of desire as a consistently destabilizing force that escapes
or positively subverts the binding and centering processes of psychic organization. The most conspicuous feature of desire is its perfect mobility; it is always on the move, continuously displacing images, unendingly exchanging
one image for another through relation and substitution. Desire always seeks
a disruption of equilibrium, a disruption that becomes specifically sexual
whenever a certain threshold of intensity is reached, so that "sexuality" is
not a different form of psychic energy but merely a measure of the intensity
of disturbance. Desire, they conclude, "produces sexuality" (p. 33), as well as
producing, at a lower level of excitation, fantasy, the introjection of desirable
objects in mental representation.
The psychoanalytic essays-on dream-theory, fetishism, the "primary"
and "secondary" processes-are shuffled in with interpretive descriptions of
the palace reliefs, producing a double, and doubled, commentary, itself a
kind of sliding between speculative psychoanalytics and a reading of artifacts. Noting the curious detachment of the men spearing a charging lion, for
example, the authors can illuminate the hunters' apparent nonchalance by referring to Freud on "Instincts and their Vicissitudes," which differentiates between sadomasochistic pleasure as excitation, and sadomasochistic fulfillment
as an absolute" discharge" through death. The enraged, gored lion represents
an excitation in the mastery over nature that constitutes the "first step" of
sadism; while the neutrality of the hunters' features, containing no traces of
excitation, suggests fulfillment. The "lesson" of the whole "is one of affectless violence-of that 'non-sexual sadism' ... [which} expresses a fantasy of
self-displacing and self-shattering desire having at last been totally evacuated. The undisturbed human mastery of the doomed lion's energy gives us
the image of an ideal, impossible control over the self and the world" (p. 35).
Thus Freudian thought illuminates certain tr.oubling features in the palace
reliefs, features which otherwise might suggest a deficiency of artistry or
even of common "humanity." But the hunters' impassivity also suggests a
counter-Freudian conclusion, that the, desire to which they testify is not a
phenomenon of psychic projection. The reliefs "solicit a type of passionate
responsiveness to the world distinct from the mimetic or identificatory responsiveness which accounts for all the psychic movements described by
Freud" (p. 37); indeed, the faces may be so empty of expression that they
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move us "merely to keep moving," frustrating our "natural" (i. e., narrative,

mimetic) desire to identify and empathize.
The analysis of the reliefs operates in a continual friction with the reading
of Freud, with the continual effect of destabilizing and decentering both the
reliefs and Freud. But the most prominent, polemic, and problematic aspect
of The Forms of Violence is the attack on narrative-the model for psychic
binding, the "dominant mimetic strategy in our culture," and the form in
which we most easily recognize reality. Indeed, Bersani and Dutoit are writing in and audaciously seeking to subvert a critical context in which narrative
is sometimes taken to be the central instance of human consciousness, a uni-

versal and unchallenged mode of perception and expression. The imperialism
of narrative over consciousness is simply repeated in the contemporary critical valuation of narrative over other modes.
Bersani and Dutoit propose another version of narrative as a mode which

reflects and promotes "forms of violence" through its hierarchical organization of details, its marginalization of the "irrelevant:' its plot and linear causality, all of which tend towards an "excessive" intelligibility and a
suppression of differences, induding the difference between art and life. In
their view, narrative is not only concerned thematically with violence, but
reenacts that violence in its formal operations, its modes of intelligibility.
Narrative systematically expels that which it cannot reduce, particularly those
figures who cannot be assimilated to a structural frame, those whose desire is

excessively mobile, induding many of the heroes and heroines of 19thcentury fiction. Desire itself, which they condude by calling "curiously mild
and pacific:' is the paradigmatic victim of narrative, whose ideal form is the
"detemporalized process" of the military march, a process.which masters all
differences in an utter "triumph of the conscious mind." Even transgressions

of narrativity in plots that meander or digress are typically thematized as obvious violations of the "deeply ingrained habit of narrativity" (p. 51).
The palace reliefs, by contrast, honor the "mobility of a forgetful perception which dismisses centers and reconstructs temporary orders" (p. 46); they
constitute "the simplest model of linear, non-transgressive storytelling," a resistance that is not implicated in the paradigm it resists. Assyrian art contin-

ually enjoins the viewer to look away from centers and toward supplemental,
nonnarrative points of interest, forestalling a destructive fixation on anecdotal

'I

violence by stimulating psychic dislocations of desire.
The question to be addressed to Bersani and Dutoit is whether, in their
scorn for contemporary narratology (whose results, they say, "have not been
very enlivening" [po 52]), they have read enough of it. Or enough narrative.
If narrative were the empire of paralysis they depict it to be it would scarcely
have stood the test of time the way it has. Indeed, time is precisely what is
left out of Bersani and Dutoit's account of narrative as detemporalized process. Essentially, Bersani and Dutoit blame narrative for structuralism's (discredited) account of it, and propose as an alternative an antinarrative
organization which tolerates the "natural tendency to swerve." In doing so,
they represent their case as being non-Western, radical, transgressive, faithful
to nature and reality. But their argument minimizes what, in tiny ways

throughout, they elsewhere concede, that the interest or life of narrative lies
precisely in those transgressions of "narrativity"-in other words, that narra-
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tivity embraces its own transgressions not simply as an opportunity for the
exercise of power but as a structural necessity. The powerful order of centering and closure is immanent in narrative, but so is wandering. Bersani and
Outoit's implicit opposition between desire and narrative might be complemented by the opposition produced by their Berkeley colleague O. A. Miller,
who, in Narrative and its Discontents (Princeton Univ. Press, 1981), opposed
"narratibility" to closure. Miller's narratibility is Bersani and Outoit's desire,
while his closure, a virtually alien force that intrudes into and dominates narrative, is their narrative. Both can't be right.
Indeed, neither is, for they both misconceive and simplify narrative, opposing it to either desire or closure, without seeing that both the restlessness of
the one and the ordered stasis of the other are intrinsic to narrative. Narrative is distinguished among modes of cognition by its capacity to unify space
and time, "vertical" and "horizontal," in a single representation. Centering
and decentering, wandering and marching, narrative enables us to think
space and time together. Strikingly, this is one way of reading the Assyrian
reliefs themselves. Always narrative, they are also always, as the authors
prove, always mobile in the forms of attention they solicit. In them, the "primary process" persists in the narrative modes that deny it; in them, an
"eruption of the errant" defies the aesthetic and psychic bonds that seek to
contain it. Where the authors go wrong is in supposing that this mobility is
counternarrative. It is, rather, narrative through and through. Finally, in their
invocation of the natural, the authors badly underestimate the naturalness of
the desire for centering, subordination and closure. Why would culture-all
cultures-develop such a form if not in "natural" response to a profound
need-and not merely the pragmatic, limited, "sadistic" need to "master our
environment," but to live in it in a fully human habitation?
This inadequacy in the conception of narrative may depend upon and reflect a parallel inadequacy in the conception of desire, an inadequacy that
emerges when the formula "Desire produces sexuality" is compared with
Foucault's statement in The History of Sexuality Volume 1 that the "deployment of sexuality" produces sex. "Sex," according to Foucault, "is the most
speCUlative, most ideal and most internal element in a deployment of sexuality organized by power in its grip on bodies and their materiality, their
forces, energies, sensations, and pleasures" (p. 155). For Bersani and Outoit,
sex is a function or reflex of an intrinsically restless and mobile udesire";
while for Foucault, sex is produced by power-mechanisms. Like narrative, sex

may be a double-faced, or double-phased, entity. If Bersani and Outoit are
correct in relating sexuality and fantasy to desire, then desire must account
for, among other things, the narrative they would oppose to it. As the body's
narrative, sex may engender excitation and movement while tending toward
expulsion, cessation and closure. Such an equivalence could help explain the
"universality" of both narrative and sex by positing a relation between the
most profound expressions of bodily need and of imaginative coherence. We
can even begin, with this suggestion, to map out the resistance between bodily and imaginative needs on the basis that both are themselves structured by
a kind of resistance between what Bersani and Outoit call the "natural tendency to swerve" and another, equally natural tendency to head for home.
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